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FINITE COMPOSITE GAMES: EQUILIBRIA AND DYNAMICS
SYLVAIN SORIN AND CHENG WAN
Abstract. We study games with finitely many participants, each having finitely many choices.
We consider the following categories of participants:
(I) populations: sets of nonatomic agents,
(II) atomic splittable players,
(III) atomic non splittable players.
We recall and compare the basic properties, expressed through variational inequalities, concerning
equilibria, potential games and dissipative games, as well as evolutionary dynamics.
Then we consider composite games where the three categories of participants are present, a typical
example being congestion games, and extend the previous properties of equilibria and dynamics.
Finally we describe an instance of composite potential game.
1. Introduction
We study equilibria and dynamics in finite games: there are finitely many “participants” i ∈ I
and each of them has finitely many “choices” p ∈ Si. The basic variable describing the strategic
interaction is thus a profile x = {xi, i ∈ I}, where each xi = {xip, p ∈ S
i} is an element of the
simplex Xi = ∆(Si) on Si. Let X =
∏
i∈I X
i.
We consider three frameworks (or categories):
(I) Population games where each participant i ∈ I corresponds to a population: a nonatomic set
of agents having all the same characteristics. In this setup xip is the proportion of agents of “type
p” in population i.
The two others correspond to two kinds of I-player games where each participant i ∈ I stands
for an atomic player:
(II) Splittable case: xip is the proportion that player i allocates to choice p. (The set of pure
moves of player i is Xi.)
(III) Non splittable case: xip is the probability that player i chooses p. (The set of pure moves is
Si and xi is a mixed strategy.)
As an example, consider the following network where a routing game of each of the three
frameworks takes place. Assume that arc 1 and arc 2 are connecting o to d.
o d
arc 1: m
arc 2: 1
First, in a population game, consider two populations of agents going from o to d. Suppose
that a proportion x11 of population 1 is taking arc 1 while the rest of the population (x
1
2 = 1−x
1
1)
uses arc 2, and similarly for population 2.
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Next, in the splittable case, consider two players who both have a stock to send from o to d
and can divide their stock. Suppose that player 1 sends a fraction x11 of his stock by arc 1 and
the remaining (x12) by arc 2, and similarly for player 2. Finally, in the non splittable case, still
consider two players having to send their stock from o to d. However, they can no longer divide
their stock, but have to send it entirely by one arc. Suppose that with probability x11 player 1
sends it by arc 1 and with probability x12 he sends it by arc 2, and similarly for player 2.
In all cases, the basic variable is x ∈ X, defined by (x11, x
2
1) ∈ [0, 1]
2.
Assume, more specifically, that the two participants are of size 12 each and that the congestion
is m on arc 1 and 1 on arc 2, if the quantity of users is m ∈ [0, 1]. Then it is easy to check that
the equilibria are given by:
– in framework I, x11 = x
2
1 = 1: all the agents choose arc 1;
– in framework II, x11 = x
2
1 =
2
3 : both players send
2
3 of their stock on arc 1 where m =
2
3 ;
– in framework III, the set of equilibria has one player choosing arc 1 (say x11 = 1) and the other
choosing at random with any x21 ∈ [0, 1].
2. Description of the models
2.1. Framework I: population games.
We consider here the nonatomic framework where each participant i ∈ I corresponds to a popu-
lation of nonatomic agents.
The payoff (fitness) is defined by a family of continuous functions {F ip, i∈I, p∈S
i} from X to
R, where F ip(x) is the outcome of an agent in population i choosing p, when the environment is
given by the basic variable x.
An equilibrium is a point x ∈ X satisfying:
xip > 0⇒ F
i
p(x) ≥ F
i
q(x), ∀p, q ∈ S
i, ∀i ∈ I. (1)
This corresponds to a Wardrop equilibrium [35].
Proposition 2.1 (Smith [26], Dafermos [4]).
An equivalent characterization of (1) is through the variational inequality:
〈F i(x), xi − yi〉 ≥ 0, ∀yi ∈ Xi,∀i ∈ I, (2)
or alternatively:
〈F (x), x − y〉 =
∑
i∈I
〈F i(x), xi − yi〉 ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ X. (3)
A special class of population games corresponds to games with external interaction where each
F i depends only on x−i.
2.2. Framework II: atomic splittable players.
In this case, each participant i ∈ I corresponds to an atomic player with action set Xi. Given
functions F ip as introduced above, his gain is defined by:
H i(x) = 〈xi, F i(x)〉 =
∑
p∈Si
xipF
i
p(x).
In other words, it is the weighted average gain of all fractions xip allocated to different choices p.
An equilibrium is as usual a profile x ∈ X satisfying:
H i(x) ≥ H i(yi, x−i), ∀yi ∈ Xi, ∀i ∈ I. (4)
Suppose that for all p ∈ Si, F ip(·) is of class C
1 on a neighborhood Ω of X, so that
∂ H i
∂ xip
(x) = F ip(x) +
∑
q∈Si
xiq
∂ F iq
∂ xip
(x).
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Let ∇iH i(x) stand for the gradient of H i(xi, x−i) with respect to xi. Then by a classical opti-
mization criteria [14] one has:
Proposition 2.2. Any solution of (4) satisfies
〈∇H(x), x− y〉 =
∑
i∈I
〈∇iH i(x), xi − yi〉 ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ X. (5)
Moreover, if each H i is concave with respect to xi, there is equivalence.
Variational inequalities characterizing Nash equilibrium in atomic splittable games (Haurie and
Marcotte [10]) and those characterizing Wardrop equilibrium in nonatomic games have different
origins. Inequalities in (5) for a Nash equilibrium are obtained as first order conditions, while
inequalities in (2) for a Wardrop equilibrium are derived directly from its definition.
2.3. Framework III: atomic non splittable.
We consider here an I-player game where the payoff is defined by a family of functions {Gi, i∈I},
all from S =
∏
i∈I S
i to R. We still denote by G the multilinear extension to X where each
Xi = ∆(Si) is considered as the set of mixed actions.
An equilibrium is a profile x ∈ X satisfying:
Gi(xi, x−i) ≥ Gi(yi, x−i), ∀yi ∈ Xi, ∀i ∈ I. (6)
Let VGi denote the vector payoff associated to Gi. Explicitly, VGip : X
−i → R is defined by
VGip(x
−i) = Gi(p, x−i), for all p ∈ Si. Hence Gi(x) = 〈xi, VGi(x−i)〉.
An equilibrium is thus a profile x ∈ X satisfying:
〈VG(x), x − y〉 =
∑
i∈I
〈VGi(x−i), xi − yi〉 ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ X. (7)
2.4. Remarks.
Frameworks I and III have been extensively studied. Framework III corresponds to games with
external interaction, but the multilinearity of VGi(x−i) will not be used in this paper.
Note that F , ∇H and VG play similar roles in the three frameworks. This can be seen from
the three variational characterizations of equilibrium: (2), (5) and (7).
We call F , ∇H and VG evaluation functions and denote them by Φ in each of the three
frameworks.
From now on, we consider the following class of games which includes (i) population games
where F ip are continuous on X for all i and p, (ii) atomic splittable games where H
i is concave
and of class C1 on a neighborhood of Xi for all i, and (iii) atomic non splittable games. A typical
game in this class is denoted by Γ(Φ), where Φ is its evaluation function.
Definition 2.1. NE(Φ) is the set of x ∈ X satisfying:
〈Φ(x), x− y〉 ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ X. (8)
NE(Φ) is the set of equilibria of Γ(Φ).
The next result recalls general properties of a variational inequality on a closed convex set.
Theorem 2.1. Let C ⊂ Rd be a closed convex set and Ψ a map from C to Rd.
Consider the variational inequality:
〈Ψ(x), x− y〉 ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ C. (9)
Four equivalent representations are given by:
Ψ(x) ∈ NC(x), (10)
where NC(x) is the normal coˆne to C at x;
Ψ(x) ∈ [TC(x)]
⊥, (11)
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where TC(x) is the tangent coˆne to C at x and [TC(x)]
⊥ its polar;
ΠTC(x)Ψ(x) = 0, (12)
where Π is the projection operator on a closed convex subset; and
ΠC [x+Ψ(x)] = x. (13)
Proof. 〈Ψ(x), x − y〉 ≥ 0 for all y ∈ C is equivalent to Ψ(x) ∈ NC(x). Hence, Ψ(x) ∈ [TC(x)]
⊥
and ΠTC(x)Ψ(x) = 0 by Moreau’s decomposition [17].
Finally the characterization of the projection gives:
〈
x+Ψ(x)−ΠC [x+Ψ(x)], y −ΠC [x+Ψ(x)]
〉
≤ 0, ∀y ∈ X.
Therefore, ΠC [x+Ψ(x)] = x is the solution. 
Note that this result holds in a Hilbert space.
3. Potential and dissipative games
3.1. Potential games.
Definition 3.1. A real function W , of class C1 on a neighborhood Ω of X, is a potential for Φ
if for each i ∈ I, there is a strictly positive function µi(x) defined on X such that
〈
∇iW (x)− µi(x)Φi(x), yi
〉
= 0, ∀x ∈ X,∀yi ∈ Xi0, ∀i ∈ I, (14)
where Xi0 = {y ∈ R
|Si|,
∑
p∈Si yp = 0} is the tangent space to X
i and ∇i denotes the gradient
w.r.t. xi.
The game Γ(Φ) is then called a potential game and one says that Φ derives from W .
Some alternative definitions of potential games have been used such as:
∂W (x)
∂xip
−
∂W (x)
∂xiq
= µi(x)[Φip(x)− Φ
i
q(x)], ∀x ∈ Ω, ∀p, q ∈ S
i (15)
or
∂W (x)
∂xip
= µi(x)Φip(x), ∀x ∈ Ω, ∀p ∈ S
i. (16)
Remark that (16) yields (15), and (15) implies that the vector {∂W (x)
∂xip
− µiΦip(x)}p∈Si is propor-
tional to (1, . . . , 1), hence is orthogonal to Xi0, thus (14) holds.
Sandholm [21] defines a population potential game by (16) with µi ≡ 1 for all i.
Monderer and Shapley [16] define potential games for finite games, which is equivalent to our
definition (15) in framework III.
Proposition 3.1. Let Γ(Φ) be a game with potential W .
1. Every local maximum of W is an equilibrium of Γ(Φ).
2. If W is concave on X, then any equilibrium of Γ(Φ) is a global maximum of W on X.
Proof. Since a local maximum x of W on the convex set X satisfies:
〈∇W (x), x− y〉 ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ X, (17)
it follows from (14) that 〈µi(x)Φi(x), xi−yi〉≥0 for all i and all y∈X. This further yields (8). On
the other hand, if W is concave on X, a solution x of (17) is a global maximum of W on X. 
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3.2. Dissipative games.
Definition 3.2. The game Γ(Φ) is dissipative if Φ satisfies:
〈Φ(x)− Φ(y), x− y〉 ≤ 0, ∀ (x, y) ∈ X ×X.
It is strictly dissipative if
〈Φ(x)− Φ(y), x− y〉 < 0, ∀ (x, y) ∈ X ×X with x 6= y.
In the framework of population games, Hofbauer and Sandholm [12] introduce this class of
games and call them “stable games”.
Notice that if Φ is dissipative and derives from a potential W , then W is concave.
The set of equilibria in dissipative games has a specific structure (see Hofbauer and Sandholm
[12, Proposition 3.1, Theorem 3.2]) described as follows.
Definition 3.3. SNE(Φ) is the set of x ∈ X satisfying:
〈Φ(y), x− y〉 ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ X. (18)
Proposition 3.2.
SNE(Φ) ⊂ NE(Φ).
If Γ(Φ) is dissipative, then
SNE(Φ) = NE(Φ).
Corollary 3.1. If Φ is dissipative, NE(Φ) is convex.
A strictly dissipative game Γ(Φ) has a unique equilibrium.
The description is more precise in the smooth case.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that Φ is of class C1 on a neighborhood Ω of X. Denote by JΦ(x) the
Jacobian matrix of Φ at x, i.e. JΦ(x) =
((∂Φip
∂x
j
q
)
q∈Sj
)
p∈Si
. Then, Φ dissipative implies that JΦ(x)
is negative semidefinite on TX(x), the tangent coˆne to X at x.
Proof. Given x ∈ X and z ∈ TX(x), there exists ǫ > 0 such that x+ tz ∈ X for all t ∈]0, ǫ]. Hence
〈Φ(x + tz) − Φ(x), x + tz − x〉 ≤ 0, which implies that 〈Φ(x+tz)−Φ(x)
x
, z〉 ≤ 0. Since Φ is of class
C1, letting t go to 0 yields 〈JΦ(x)z, z〉 ≤ 0. 
Definition 3.4. Suppose that Φ is of class C1 on a neighborhood Ω of X. The game Γ(Φ) is
strongly dissipative if JΦ(x) is negative definite on TX(x).
4. Dynamics
4.1. Definitions.
The general form of a dynamics describing the evolution of the strategic interaction in game Γ(Φ)
is given by:
x˙ = BΦ(x), x ∈ X,
where X is invariant, so that for each i ∈ I, BiΦ(x) ∈ X
i
0.
First recall the definitions of several dynamics expressed in terms of Φ.
(1) Replicator dynamics (RD) (Taylor and Jonker [31])
x˙ip = x
i
p[Φ
i
p(x)− Φ
i
(x)], p ∈ Si, i ∈ I,
where
Φ
i
(x) = 〈xi,Φi(x)〉 =
∑
p∈Si
xipΦ
i
p(x)
is the average evaluation for participant i.
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(2) Brown-von-Neumann-Nash dynamics (BNN) (Brown and von Neumann [2], Smith [27, 29],
Hofbauer [11])
x˙ip = Φˆ
i
p − x
i
p
∑
q∈Si
Φˆiq, p ∈ S
i, i ∈ I,
where Φˆiq = [Φ
i
q(x)−Φ
i
(x)]+ is called the “excess evaluation” of p. (Recall that [t]+ , max{t, 0}.)
(3) Smith dynamics (Smith) (Smith [28])
x˙ip =
∑
q∈Si
xiq[Φ
i
p(x)− Φ
i
q(x)]
+ − xip
∑
q∈Si
[Φiq(x)− Φ
i
p(x)]
+, p ∈ Si, i ∈ I,
where [Φip(x)− Φ
i
q(x)]
+ corresponds to pairwise comparison [24].
(4) Local/direct projection dynamics (LP) (Dupuis and Nagurney [5], Lahkar and Sandholm [15])
x˙i = ΠT
Xi
(xi)[Φ
i(x)], i ∈ I,
where TXi(x
i) denotes the tangent coˆne to Xi at xi.
(5) Global/target projection dynamics (GP) (Friesz et al. [6], Tsakas and Voorneveld [32])
x˙i = ΠXi [x
i +Φi(x)]− xi, i ∈ I.
Recall that the two dynamics above are linked by: ΠT
Xi
(xi)[Φ
i(x)] = limδ→0+
Π
Xi
(xi+δΦi(x))−xi
δ
.
(6) Best reply dynamics (BR) (Gilboa and Matsui [7])
x˙i ∈ BRi(x)− xi, i ∈ I,
where
BRi(x) = {yi ∈ Xi, 〈yi − zi,Φi(x)〉 ≥ 0,∀zi ∈ Xi}.
4.2. General properties.
We define here properties expressed in terms of Φ.
Definition 4.1. Dynamics BΦ satisfies:
i) positive correlation (PC) (Sandholm [21]) if:
〈BiΦ(x),Φ
i(x)〉 > 0, ∀i ∈ I,∀x ∈ X s.t. BiΦ(x) 6= 0.
(This corresponds to MAD (myopic adjustment dynamics) (Swinkels [30]): assuming the config-
uration given, an unilateral change should increase the evaluation);
ii) Nash stationarity if:
for x ∈ X, BΦ(x) = 0 if and only if x is an equilibrium of Γ(Φ).
The next proposition collect results that have been obtained in different frameworks. We
provide a unified treatment with simple and short proofs.
Proposition 4.1. (RD), (BNN), (Smith), (LP), (GP) and (BR) satisfy (PC).
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Proof.
(1) RD (Sandholm [23, 24]):
〈BiΦ(x),Φ
i(x)〉 =
∑
p∈Si
xip
[
Φip(x)−Φ
i
(x)
]
Φip(x)
=
∑
p∈Si
xip
[
Φip(x)−Φ
i
(x)
]2
+
∑
p∈Si
xip
[
Φip(x)− Φ
i
(x)
]
Φ
i
(x)
=
∑
p∈Si
xip
[
Φip(x)−Φ
i
(x)
]2
+
[ ∑
p∈Si
xipΦ
i
p(x)− Φ
i
(x)
]
Φ
i
(x)
=
∑
p∈Si
xip
[
Φip(x)−Φ
i
(x)
]2
≥ 0.
The equality holds if and only if for all p ∈ Si, xip [Φ
i(x)−Φ
i
(x)]2 = 0 or, equivalently xip [Φ
i(x)−
Φ
i
(x)] = 0, hence BiΦ(x) = 0.
(2) BNN (Sandholm [21, 22, 24], Hofbauer [11]):
〈BiΦ(x),Φ
i(x)〉 =
∑
p∈Si
[
Φˆip(x)− x
i
p
∑
q∈Si
Φˆiq(x)
]
Φip(x) =
∑
p∈Si
Φˆip(x)Φ
i
p(x)−
∑
p∈Si
xipΦ
i
p(x)
∑
q∈Si
Φˆiq(x)
=
∑
p∈Si
Φˆip(x)Φ
i
p(x)−
∑
q∈Si
Φˆiq(x)Φ
i
(x) =
∑
p∈Si
Φˆip(x)
[
Φip(x)− Φ
i
(x)
]
=
∑
p∈Si
(Φˆip(x))
2 ≥ 0.
The equality holds if and only if for all p ∈ Si, Φˆip(x) = 0, in which case B
i
Φ(x) = 0.
(3) Smith (Sandholm [23, 24]):
〈BiΦ(x),Φ
i(x)〉 =
∑
p∈Si
( ∑
q∈Si
xiq[Φ
i
p(x)− Φ
i
q(x)]
+
)
Φip(x)−
∑
p∈Si
xipΦ
i
p(x)
∑
q∈Si
[Φiq(x)− Φ
i
p(x)]
+
=
∑
p,q
xiqΦ
i
p(x)[Φ
i
p(x)− Φ
i
q(x)]
+ −
∑
q,p
xiqΦ
i
q(x)[Φ
i
p(x)− Φ
i
q(x)]
+
=
∑
p,q
xiq([Φ
i
p(x)− Φ
i
q(x)]
+)2 ≥ 0.
The equality holds if and only if for all q ∈ Si, either xiq = 0 or Φ
i
q(x) ≥ Φ
i
p(x) for all p ∈ S
i, in
which case BiΦ(x) = 0.
(4) LP (Lahkar and Sandholm [15], Sandholm [24]): Recall that, if NXi(x
i) denotes the normal
coˆne to Xi at xi (the polar of TXi(x
i)), then for any v ∈ RS
i
: v = ΠT
Xi
(xi)v + ΠN
Xi
(xi)v and
〈ΠT
Xi
(xi)v,ΠN
Xi
(xi)v〉 = 0 (Moreau’s decomposition, [17]). Thus,
〈BiΦ(x),Φ
i(x)〉 =
〈
ΠT
Xi
(xi)[Φ
i(x)],Φi(x)
〉
=
〈
ΠT
Xi
(xi)[Φ
i(x)],ΠT
Xi
(xi)[Φ
i(x)] + ΠN
Xi
(xi)[Φ
i(x)]
〉
=
∥∥ΠT
Xi
(xi)[Φ
i(x)]
∥∥2 ≥ 0,
and the equality holds if and only if ΠT
Xi
(xi)[Φ
i(x)] = 0, i.e. BiΦ(x) = 0.
(5) GP (Tsakas and Voorneveld [32]): Let z = x+Φ(x). Then,
〈BiΦ(x),Φ
i(x)〉 =
〈
ΠXi(z
i)− xi, zi − xi
〉
=
〈
ΠXi(z
i)− xi, zi −ΠXi(z
i) + ΠXi(z
i)− xi
〉
= −
〈
xi −ΠXi(z
i), zi −ΠXi(z
i)
〉
+ ‖ΠXi(z
i)− xi‖2
≥ ‖ΠXi(z
i)− xi‖2 ≥ 0.
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The second last inequality holds since xi ∈ Xi, thus
〈
xi−ΠXi(z
i), zi−ΠXi(z
i)
〉
≤ 0. The equality
occurs in both inequalities if and only if xi = ΠXi(z
i), in which case BiΦ(x) = 0.
(6) BR (Sandholm [24]):
〈BiΦ(x),Φ
i(x)〉 = 〈yi − xi,Φi(x)〉 ≥ 0
since yi ∈ BRi(x). The equality holds if and only if xi ∈ BRi(x), hence BiΦ(x) = 0. 
Proposition 4.2. (BNN), (Smith), (LP), (GP) and (BR) satisfy Nash stationarity on X.
(RD) satisfy Nash stationarity on intX.
Proof.
(1) BNN (Sandholm [21, 22, 24]): x ∈ NE(Φ) is equivalent to: Φˆp(x) = 0 for all p ∈ S. Hence
BΦ(x) = 0.
Reciprocally, assume the existence of i ∈ I and p ∈ Si such that Φˆip(x) > 0. Since there exists q
with xiq > 0 and Φˆ
i
q(x) = 0, one obtains B
i
Φ,q(x) < 0, contradiction.
(2) Smith (Sandholm [23, 24]): Assume x ∈ NE(Φ). Then for all i ∈ I and q ∈ Si, either xiq = 0
or Φiq(x) ≥ Φ
i
p(x) for all p ∈ S
i. Hence BΦ(x) = 0.
Reciprocally, assume the existence of i ∈ I and p ∈ Si such that xip > 0 and [Φ
i
q(x)−Φ
i
p(x)]
+ >
0. Choose such a p with smallest Φip(x) then one obtains B
i
Φ,p(x) < 0.
(3) LP (Lahkar and Sandholm [15], Sandholm [24]): The result follows from (12).
(4) GP (Tsakas and Voorneveld [32]): The result follows from (13).
(5) BR (Sandholm [24]): By definition BΦ(x) = 0 if and only if x
i ∈ BRi(x) hence x ∈ NE(Φ).
(6) RD (Sandholm [23, 24]): Assume x ∈ intX ∩NE(Φ). Then, Φip(x) = Φ
i
(x) for all i ∈ I and
p ∈ Si and thus BΦ(x) = 0.
Reciprocally, if x ∈ intX and BΦ(x) = 0, x is equalizing hence in NE(Φ). 
4.3. Potential games.
We establish here results that are valid for all three frameworks of games.
Proposition 4.3. Consider a potential game Γ(Φ) with potential function W . If the dynamics
x˙ = BΦ(x) satisfies (PC), then W is a strict Lyapunov function for BΦ. Besides, all ω-limit
points are rest points of BΦ.
Proof. Consider x ∈ X. Let {xt}t≥0 be the trajectory of BΦ with initial point x0 = x, and
Vt =W (xt) for t ≥ 0. Then
V˙t = 〈∇W (xt), x˙t〉 =
∑
i∈I
〈∇iW (xt), x˙
i
t〉 =
∑
i∈I
µi(x)〈Φi(xt), x˙
i
t〉 ≥ 0.
(Recall that x˙t ∈ X0.) Moreover, 〈Φ
i(xt), x˙
i
t〉 = 0 holds for all i if and only if x˙ = BΦ(xt) = 0.
One concludes by using Lyapunov’s theorem (e.g. [13, Theorem 2.6.1]). 
This result is proved by Sandholm [21] for the version of potential games in framework I defined
by (16).
It follows that, with the appropriate definitions, the convergence results established for several
dynamics and potential games in framework I or III extend to all dynamics and frameworks.
Explicitly:
Proposition 4.4. Consider a potential game Γ(Φ) with potential function W .
If the dynamics is (RD), (BNN), (Smith), (LP), (GP) or (BR), W is a strict Lyapunov function
for BΦ.
In addition, except for (RD), all ω-limit points are equilibria of Γ(Φ).
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4.4. Dissipative games. We apply also for this class the previous “dictionary” used for potential
games and dynamics.
Proposition 4.5. Consider a dissipative game Γ(Φ).
(1) RD: Let x∗ ∈ NE(Φ). Define [12]:
H(x) =
∑
i∈I
∑
p∈supp(xi∗)
xi∗p ln
xi∗p
xip
.
Then H is a local Lyapunov function.
If Γ(Φ) is strictly dissipative, then H is a local strict Lyapunov function.
(2) BNN: Assume Φ C1 on a neighborhood Ω of X. Define [27, 29, 11]:
H(x) =
1
2
∑
i∈I
∑
p∈Si
Φˆip(x)
2.
Then H is a strict Lyapunov function which is minimal on NE(Φ).
(3) Smith: Assume Φ C1 on a neighborhood Ω of X. Define [28]:
H(x) =
∑
i∈I
∑
p,q∈Si
xip
{
[Φiq(x)− Φ
i
p(x)]
+
}2
.
Then H is a strict Lyapunov function which is minimal on NE(Φ).
(4) LP: Let x∗ ∈ NE(Φ). Define [18, 37, 19]:
H(x) =
1
2
‖x− x∗‖2.
Then H is a Lyapunov function.
If Γ(Φ) is strictly dissipative, then H is a strict Lyapunov function.
(5) GP: Assume Φ C1 on a neighborhood Ω of X. Define [20]:
H(x) = sup
y∈X
〈 y − x,Φ(x) 〉 −
1
2
‖y − x‖2.
Then H is a Lyapunov function.
If Γ(Φ) is strictly dissipative, then H is a strict Lyapunov function.
(6) BR: Assume Φ C1 on a neighborhood Ω of X. Define [12]:
H(x) = sup
y∈X
〈 y − x,Φ(x) 〉.
Then H is a strict Lyapunov function which is minimal on NE(Φ).
The proof is in Apprendix.
5. Example: congestion games
An eminent example of the games studied in this paper is a network congestion game, or
routing game. The underlying network is a finite directed graph G = (V,A), where V is the set
of nodes and A the set of links. The vector l = (la)a∈A denotes a family of cost functions from R
to R+: if the aggregate weight on arc a is m, the cost per unit (of weight) is la(m).
The set I of participants is finite. A participant i is characterized by his weight mi and an
origin/destination pair (oi, di) ∈ V × V such that the constraint is to send a quantity mi from
oi to di. The set of choices of participant i ∈ I is Si: directed acyclic paths linking oi to di and
available to i. Let P = ∪i∈IS
i.
Assume that, for all arcs a ∈ A, the function la is continuous and finite on a neighborhood U
of the interval [0, M ] and positive on U ∩R+, where M =
∑
i∈I m
i is the aggregate weight of the
players.
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In each of the three frameworks considered in this paper, a participant is respectively a popula-
tion of nonatomic agents (I), an atomic splittable player (II) and an atomic non splittable player
(III). Thus, in framework I, a fraction xip of population i takes path p; in framework II, x
i
p is the
proportion of the weight mi sent on path p by player i; in framework III, xip is the probability
with which player i take path p. The basic variable x is a profile of strategies of the participants
and the corresponding set is X =
∏
i∈I X
i.
In frameworks I and II, a strategy xi induces a flow f i on the arcs (or simply flow) for each
participant i. Explicitly, the weight on arc a is f ia =
∑
p∈Si, p∋am
ixip. Define the aggregate
configuration z = (zp)p∈P , where zp =
∑
i∈I,Si∋pm
ixip. The aggregate flow is f = (fa)a∈A, with
fa =
∑
i∈I f
i
a the aggregate weight on arc a. Notice that f can also be induced by the aggregate
configuration z. Denote f−ia = fa − f
i
a.
Given an aggregate configuration z and aggregate flow f , the vector of congestion on the arcs
is l(f) = {la(fa)}a∈A. This specifies now the cost of a path p by cp(z) =
∑
a∈p la(fa). The
corresponding vectors are ci(z) = (cp(z))p∈Si for i ∈ I, c(z) = (c
i(z))i∈I , and l
i(f) = l(f) for
all i ∈ I. In particular, path costs cp and arc costs la are determined only by the aggregate
configuration or the aggregate flow.
The evaluation functions in the first two frameworks are respectively:
I: population: Φip(x) = −cp(z).
II: atomic splittable: Φip(x) = −
∂ui(x)
∂xip
, where ui(x) is the cost to atomic player i:
ui(x) = 〈xi, ci(z)〉 =
∑
p∈Si
xip cp(z) =
1
mi
〈f i, l(f)〉 =
1
mi
∑
a∈A
f ia la(fa).
In framework III, first consider the arc flow f and aggregate arc flow f induced by a pure-
strategy profile s: fa(s) =
∑
i∈I f
i
a(s) and f
i
a(s) = m
i
1a∈si . Then the evaluation function is
Φip(x) = −VU
i
p(p, x
−i) = −U i(p, x−i), where
U i(x) =
∑
s∈
∏
j∈I S
j
∏
j∈I
x
j
sj
∑
a∈si
la(fa(s))
Congestion games are thus natural settings where each kind of participants occurs. However
one can even consider a game where participants of different natures coexist: some of them being
of category I, II or III. This leads to the notion of composite game which is introduced in full
generality in Section 6. Consider here a simple example where there are three participants in the
network: population 1 of nonatomic agents of weight m1, atomic splittable player 2 of weight
m2, and atomic non splittable player 3 of weight m3. Suppose that their basic variables are
x1 = (x1p)p∈S1 , x
2 = (x2q)q∈S2 and x
3 = (x3s)s∈S3 respectively. Here x
1 and x2 describe pure
strategies while x3 specifies a mixed strategy.
Let us first look at the pure-strategy profiles. Given a pure strategy s ∈ S3, let x = (x1, x2, s),
f(x) be the induced aggregate flow: fa(x) =
∑
p∈S1, p∋am
1x1p +
∑
q∈S2, q∋am
2x2q +m
3
1{a∈s} and
z the induced configuration. The corresponding cost of a path p is cp(z) =
∑
a∈p la(fa(x)).
Therefore the cost to an agent in population 1 using path p (if x1p > 0) is cp(z) for all p ∈ S
1, the
cost to atomic splittable player 2 is u2(x) =
∑
q∈S2 x
2
qcq(z), and the cost to atomic non splittable
player 3 is u3(x) = cs(z).
Consider now a strategy profile x = (x1, x2, x3). This induces a distribution on pure strategy
profiles (x1, x2, s) hence a distribution on the sets of aggregate distributions zs. The cost to each
player is then obtained by taking the relevant expectation. Explicitly, for population 1, the cost
to an agent in the population using path p (if x1p > 0) is
∑
s∈S3 x
3
scp(zs), while its evaluation
function is Φ1(x) = (Φ1p(x))p∈S1 where Φ
1
p(x) = −
∑
s∈S3 x
3
scp(zs). For atomic splittable player 2,
his cost is u2(x) =
∑
s∈S3 x
3
s
∑
q∈S2 x
2
qcq(zs), while his evaluation function is Φ
2(x) = (Φ2q(x))q∈S2
FINITE COMPOSITE GAMES: EQUILIBRIA AND DYNAMICS 11
where Φ2q(x) = −
∂u2(x)
∂x2q
. For atomic non splittable player 3, his cost is u3(x) =
∑
s∈S3 x
3
scs(zs),
while his evaluation function is Φ3(x) = (Φ3s(x))s∈S3 where Φ
3
s(x) = −cs(zs).
Through this example, one can further see that congestion games are a natural example of an
aggregative game (see [25]) where the payoff of a participant i depends only on xi ∈ Xi and on
some fixed dimensional function αi({xj}j 6=i) ∈ ∆(R
P ) (here the aggregate distribution induced by
the participants −i). Because of the aggregative property of congestion games, one can show that
accumulation points of flows induced by Nash equilibria for a sequence of composite congestion
games, when the atomic players split into identical players with vanishing weights, are Wardrop
equilibria of the ‘limit’ nonatomic game, i.e. the nonatomic game obtained where the atomic
splittable players in the previous sequences games are replaced by populations of nonatomic
agents. This result shows intrinsic link between the different frameworks discussed in this paper.
The reader is referred to Haurie and Marcotte [10] or Wan [33] for details.
In framework II, ui is of class C1 and convex when the arc cost functions satisfy a mild condition,
as the following lemma shows [34, Lemma 29].
Proposition 5.1. In Γ(Φ), if each cost function la is of class C
1, nondecreasing and convex on
U , for all arc a ∈ A, then ui(xi, x−i) is convex with respect to xi on a neighborhood of Xi for all
fixed x−i ∈ X−i.
6. Composite Games
6.1. Composite games and variational inequalities.
We have seen that the properties of equilibrium and dynamics in the three frameworks all depend
on the evaluation function Φ and the variational inequalities associated to it. Based upon this
idea, let us define a more general class of games called composite games, which exhibit different
categories of players. Composite congestion games with participants of categories I and II have
been studied by Harker [8], Boulogne et al. [1], Yang and Zhang [36] and Cominetti et al. [3],
among others.
Consider a finite set I1 of populations composed of nonatomic agents, a finite set I2 of atomic
splittable players and a finite set I3 of atomic non splittable players. Let I = I1 ∪ I2 ∪ I3.
All the analysis of Sections 3 and 4 extend to this setting where x = {xi}i∈I1∪I2∪I3 and Φ
i(x)
depends upon the category of participant i.
Explicitly, there are finitely many “participants” i ∈ I and each of them has finitely many
“choices” p ∈ Si. Vector xi = {xip, p∈S
i} belongs to simplexXi = ∆(Si) on Si andX =
∏
i∈I X
i.
For i ∈ I1, the payoff F
i
p, p ∈ S
i is a continuous function on X and Φi = F i.
For i ∈ I2, F
i
p, p ∈ S
i is a continuous function on X and the payoff H i(x) = 〈xi, F i(x)〉 is concave
and of class C1 on a neighborhood of Xi. Then Φi = ∇iH i.
For i ∈ I3, VG
i
p is continuous on X
−i, the payoff is Gi(x) = 〈xi, VGi(x−i)〉 and Φi = VGi.
Let this composite game be denoted by Γ(Φ).
The main point to note is that the evaluation by participant i is independent of the category
of his/her opponent (their evaluation functions Φ−i) hence the analysis of Section 2 implies the
following.
Proposition 6.1. x ∈ X is a composite equilibrium of a composite game Γ(Φ) if and only if
〈Φ(x), x− y〉 ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ X. (19)
An example of such a composite game is a congestion game with the three categories of par-
ticipants in a network (see Section 5).
6.2. Composite potential games and composite dynamics.
Once the equilibria of a composite game are formulated in terms of solutions of variational
inequalities, those properties of equilibria and dynamics based on such a formulation in the
three frameworks discussed so far are naturally inherited in the composite setting.
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The general form of a dynamics in a composite game Γ(Φ) is again
x˙ = BΦ(x).
The definitions of positive correlation and Nash stationarity for BΦ are exactly the same as in
Definition 4.1.
Arguments similar to those for Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 show the following.
Proposition 6.2. In composite game Γ(Φ), composite dynamics (Smith), (BNN), (LP), (GP)
and (RD) satisfy (PC) and Nash stationarity on X.
(RD) satisfies (PC) and Nash stationarity on intX.
The definition of a potential game and that of a dissipative game for composite games are
analogous to those for each of the three frameworks. Note that the condition for each participant
is independent of the others. Hence the corresponding properties of composite dynamics for these
specific classes of composite games can be proved in the same way as for Propositions 4.4 and
4.5.
Definition 6.1. A composite game Γ(Φ) is a composite potential game if there is a real-valued
function W of class C1 defined on a neighborhood Ω of X, called potential function, and strictly
positive functions µi, i ∈ I on X such that for all x ∈ X,〈
∇iW (x)− µi(x)Φi(x), yi
〉
= 0, ∀x ∈ X,∀yi ∈ Xi0, ∀i ∈ I, (20)
where Xi0 = {y ∈ R
|Si|,
∑
p∈Si yp = 0} for all i ∈ I.
Proposition 6.3. In a composite potential game Γ(Φ) with potential function W , if the dynamics
x˙ = BΦ(x) satisfies Nash stationarity and (PC), then W is a global strict Lyapunov function for
BΦ. Besides, all ω-limit points are rest points of BΦ.
Corollary 6.1. A potential function W of a composite potential game Γ(Φ) is a global strict
Lyapunov function for (RD), (Smith), (BNN), (LP), (GP) and (BR).
Definition 6.2. A composite game Γ(Φ) is a composite dissipative game if −Φ is a monotone
operator on X. The game is strictly dissipative if −Φ is strictly monotone on X.
Proposition 6.4. If a composite congestion game Γ(Φ) is dissipative, then one can find Lyapunov
functions for (RD), (Smith), (BNN), (LP), (GP) and (BR) as defined in Proposition 4.5 (with
the assumption that Φ is of class C1 for (Smith), (BNN), (GP) and (BR)).
As a matter of fact, we can obtain results stronger than Proposition 6.1, Corollary 6.1 and
Proposition 6.3 which consider only homogeneous dynamical models, i.e. where all the partici-
pants follow the same dynamics. Looking more closely into the proofs for the results in Sections
4.2-4.4, one can see that the results extend naturally to heterogeneous dynamical models where
the participants follow specific dynamics.
Basically note that the condition for positive correlation can be written component by compo-
nent, hence it corresponds to a unilateral property: it depends only for each participant i on the
evaluation Φi and the dynamics BiΦ = B
i
Φi . For example, in a composite potential game, as long
as each of the dynamics followed by different participants satisfies (PC), the potential function
is a strict Lyapunov function. Because of this unilateral property, the dynamics in this paper
belong to the class of uncoupled dynamics studied by Hart and Mas-Colell [9].
6.3. One example of a composite potential game.
Consider a composite congestion game, with three categories of participants i ∈ I = I1 ∪ I2 ∪ I3,
of weight mi each, taking place in a network composed of two nodes o and d connected by a finite
set A of parallel arcs.
Denote by s = (sk)k∈I3 ∈ S3 = A
I3 a pure strategy profile of participants in I3 and let
z = ((xi)i∈I1 , (x
j)j∈I2 , (s
k)k∈I3). Let f(z) be the aggregate flow induced by the pure-strategy
profile z. Namely: fa(z) =
∑
i∈I1
mixia +
∑
j∈I2
mjx
j
a +
∑
k∈I3
mk1{sk=a}.
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Figure 1. Example of a composite potential game
O D
l1(·)
l2(·)
lA−1(·)
lA(·)
Theorem 6.1. Assume that for all a ∈ A, the per-unit cost function is affine, i.e. la(m) =
bam + da, with ba > 0 and da ≥ 0. Then a composite congestion game in this network is a
potential game.
A potential function defined on X is given by:
W (x) = −
∑
s∈S3
( ∏
k∈I3
xksk
){1
2
∑
a∈A
ba
[
(fa(z)
2 +
∑
j∈I2
(mjxja)
2 +
∑
k∈I3
(mk)21{sk=a}
]
+
∑
a∈A
dafa(z)
}
,
(21)
with µi(x) ≡ mi for all i ∈ I = I1 ∪ I2 ∪ I3 and all x ∈ X.
Proof. First notice that function W defined in (21) is the multilinear extension of the following
function defined on Z, the set of pure-strategy profiles:
W (z) = −
1
2
∑
a∈A
ba
[
(fa(z))
2 +
∑
j∈I2
(mjxja)
2 +
∑
k∈I3
(mk)21{sk=a}
]
+
∑
a∈A
dafa(z).
The per-unit cost to take arc a when the pure-strategy profile is z is ca(z) = bafa(z) + da, for
all arc a ∈ A. Recall that this is the opposite of the evaluation for the nonatomic players in
population i ∈ I1: Φ
i
a(z) = −ca(z). On the other hand,
−
∂W (z)
∂xia
=
1
2
ba · 2fa(z) ·m
i + dam
i = mi
[
bafa(z) + da
]
= mica(z). (22)
For an atomic splittable player j ∈ I2, when the pure-strategy profile is z, the cost is u
j(z) =∑
a∈A x
j
a
[
bafa(z) + da
]
. Therefore,
∂uj(z)
∂x
j
a
= bafa(z) + da + bam
jxja = −Φ
j
a(z).
On the other hand,
−
∂W (z)
∂x
j
a
=
1
2
ba
[
2mjfa(z)+2(m
j)2xja
]
+dam
j = mj
[
bafa(z)+bam
jxja+da
]
= mj
∂uj(z)
∂x
j
a
. (23)
Finally, for an atomic non splittable player k ∈ I3, the cost to take arc a when the other players
play z−k is uk(z−k, a) = bafa(z
−k, a) + da = Φ
k
a. On the one hand,
uk(z−k, a)− uk(z−k, r) = [ bafa(z
−k, a) + da ]− [ brfr(z
−k, r) + dr ].
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On the other hand,
W (z−k, r)−W (z−k, a)
=
∑
p∈A
bp
2
[
(fp(z
−k, a))2 +
∑
j∈I2
(mjxjp)
2
]
+
∑
p∈A
dpfp(z
−k, a) +
1
2
[ba(m
k)2 +
∑
l∈I3\{k}
bsl(m
l)2]
−
∑
p∈A
bp
2
[
(fp(z
−k, r))2 +
∑
j∈I2
(mjxjp)
2
]
−
∑
p∈A
dpfp(z
−k, r)−
1
2
[br(m
k)2 +
∑
l∈I3\{k}
bsl(m
l)2]
=
∑
p∈{a,r}
[bp
2
(fp(z
−k, a))2 + dpfp(z
−k, a)−
bp
2
(fp(z
−k, r))2 − dpfp(z
−k, r)
]
+
ba(m
k)2
2
−
br(m
k)2
2
=
ba
2
[fa(z
−k, a)]2 + dafa(z
−k, a)−
ba
2
[fa(z
−k, a)−mk]2 − da[fa(z
−k, a)−mk] +
ba(m
k)2
2
+
br
2
[fr(z
−k, r)−mk]2 + dr[fr(z
−k, r)−mk]−
br
2
[fr(z
−k, r)]2 − drfr(z
−k, r)−
br(m
k)2
2
= mk[bafa(z
−k, a) + da]−m
k[brfr(z
−k, r) + dr].
Thus
W (z−k, r)−W (z−k, a) = mk[uk(z−k, a)− uk(z−k, r)]. (24)
By a multilinear extension with respect to z, (22)–(24) imply (20). 
One can verify that the potential functionW is concave on X. Therefore, x ∈ X is a composite
equilibrium of this composite congestion game if and only if it is a global maximizer of the potential
function W .
Concerning the dynamics in this congestion game, note that Proposition 6.3 applies.
7. Conclusion
This paper first describes three frameworks with distinct categories of participants: nonatomic
populations, atomic splittable and atomic non splittable players, then introduces a class of games
called composite games where the three categories coexist. We show that the static properties
of the equilibria such as its characterization via variational inequalities, some conditions for the
dynamics studied such as positive correlation, and the notion of potential games and dissipative
games as well as their properties can be extended to composite games. In particular, the unilateral
property of the dynamics and that of the positive correlation condition allow the dynamical system
to converge when different participants follow different dynamics in a composite game.
As a matter of fact, one can further define a more general category of atomic players, called
composite players. A composite player of weight mi is described by the splittable component
of weight mi,0 and the non splittable components of weight mi,l hence represented by a vector
mi = (mi,0,mi,1, . . . ,mi,n
i
), where ni ∈ IN∗, mi,0 ≥ 0, mi,l > 0 and mi,0+
∑ni
l=1m
i,l = mi. Player
i may allocate proportions of the splittable component to different choices and also allocate
different non splittable components to different choices. However, a non splittable component
cannot be divided.
Equilibria and dynamics in this set-up will be studied in a forthcoming work.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.5. For a trajectory of dynamics x˙ = BΦ(x) with initial point x0,
dH
dt (xt) = 〈∇H(xt), x˙t〉 = 〈∇H(xt),BΦ(xt)〉 =
∑
i∈I
〈∇iH(xt),B
i
Φ(xt)〉.
Hence we focus on 〈∇H(xt),BΦ(xt)〉. The subscript for time t is omitted.
(1) RD: Given an equilibrium x∗, define H(x) =
∑
i∈I h
i(xi) with hi(xi) =
∑
p∈supp(xi∗) x
i∗
p ln
xi∗p
xip
.
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H has a strict local minimum at x∗. In fact, consider the neighborhood of x∗ in X defined by
V = {x ∈ X, supp(x∗) ⊂ supp(x)}. The concavity of lnx and Jensen’s inequality imply:
hi(xi) = −
∑
p∈supp(xi∗)
xi∗p ln
xip
xi∗p
≥ − ln
( ∑
p∈supp(xi∗)
xi∗p
xip
xi∗p
)
≥ − ln
( ∑
p∈supp(x)
xip
)
= 0,
and the equality in both inequalities holds if and only if xi = xi∗.
Consider a trajectory of the RD dynamics with initial point x0 ∈ V.
〈∇H(x),BΦ(x)〉 = −
∑
i∈I
∑
p∈supp(xi∗)
xi∗p
xip
xip
[
Φip(x)− 〈x
i,Φi(x)〉
]
=
∑
i∈I
〈xi − xi∗,Φi(x)〉 = 〈x− x∗,Φ(x)〉.
For x 6= x∗, since Γ(Φ) is dissipative (resp. strictly dissipative), one has 〈x − x∗,Φ(x) −
Φ(x∗)〉 ≤ (resp. <) 0, which implies that 〈x − x∗,Φ(x)〉 ≤ (resp. <) 〈x − x∗,Φ(x∗)〉 ≤ 0,
i.e. 〈∇H(x),BΦ(x)〉 ≤ (resp. <) 0.
Therefore, H is a local Lyapunov function when Γ(Φ) is dissipative. If Γ(Φ) is strictly dissipa-
tive, then x∗ is the unique equilibrium, and H is a strict local Lyapunov function.
This result is given by Hofbauer and Sandholm [12] for population games.
(2) BNN: H(x) = 12
∑
i∈I
∑
p∈Si Φˆ
i
p(x)
2.
〈∇H(x),BΦ(x)〉 =
∑
j∈I
∑
q∈Sj
∂
∂x
j
q
[ ∑
i∈I,p∈Si
Φˆip(x)
2
]
x˙jq.
For i = j,
∂
∂x
j
q
Φˆip(x)
2 = 2Φˆip(x)
∂
∂x
j
q
Φˆip(x) = 2Φˆ
i
p(x)
[
∂
∂x
j
q
Φip(x)− 〈x
i, ∂
∂x
j
q
Φi(x)〉 − Φjq(x)
]
,
and for i 6= j,
∂
∂x
j
q
Φˆip(x)
2 = 2Φˆip(x)
[
∂
∂x
j
q
Φip(x)− 〈x
i, ∂
∂x
j
q
Φi(x)〉
]
.
Thus,
〈∇H(x),BΦ(x)〉 =
∑
j∈I
∑
q∈Sj
∑
i∈I
∑
p∈Si
[
Φˆip(x)− x
i
p
∑
r∈Si
Φˆir(x)
]
∂
∂x
j
q
Φip(x)x˙
j
q
−
∑
i∈I
[ ∑
p∈Si
Φˆip(x)
][ ∑
q∈Si
Φiq(x)x˙
i
q
]
= 〈BΦ(x), JΦ(x)BΦ(x)〉 −
∑
i∈I
[ ∑
p∈Si
Φˆip(x)
]
〈Φi(x),BiΦ(x)〉.
Since BΦ(x) ∈ TX(x) and Γ(Φ) is dissipative, 〈BΦ(x), JΦ(x)BΦ(x)〉 ≤ 0. Because BNN dynamics
satisfies (PC), 〈Φi(x),BiΦ(x)〉 > 0 for x such that B
i
Φ(x) 6= 0, hence 〈∇H(x),BΦ(x)〉 ≤ 0 and the
equality holds if and only if BΦ(x) = 0.
Therefore, H is a strict Lyapunov function.
It is clear that H(x) ≥ 0 and the equality holds if and only if for all i ∈ I and all p ∈ Si,
Φˆip(x) = 0, i.e. x ∈ NE(Φ).
This result is proved by Smith [27, 29] in a more general version and by Hofbauer [11] for
one-population games.
(3) Smith: H(x) =
∑
i∈I
∑
p,q∈Si x
i
p{[Φ
i
q(x)− Φ
i
p(x)]
+)2.
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One has:
∂H(x)
∂xip
=
∑
q∈Si
(
[Φiq − Φ
i
p]
+
)2
+
∑
j∈I
{∑
l∈Sj
x
j
l
∑
q∈Sj
2[Φjq − Φ
j
l ]
+
(∂Φjq
∂xip
−
∂Φj
l
∂xip
)
}
=
∑
q∈Si
([Φiq − Φ
i
p]
+)2 + 2
∑
j∈I
∑
q∈Sj
{∑
l∈Sj
x
j
l [Φ
j
q − Φ
j
l ]
+ − xjq
∑
l∈Sj
[Φjl − Φ
j
q]
+
}∂Φjq
∂xip
=
∑
q∈Si
([Φiq − Φ
i
p]
+)2 + 2
∑
j∈I
∑
q∈Sj
x˙jq
∂Φjq
∂xip
.
It follows that:
〈∇H(x),BΦ(x)〉 = A+ 2〈BΦ(x), JΦ(x)BΦ(x)〉,
where:
A =
∑
i∈I
∑
p,q∈Si
([Φiq − Φ
i
p]
+)2x˙ip
=
∑
i∈I
∑
p,q∈Si
(
[Φiq − Φ
i
p]
+
)2{∑
l∈Si
xil[Φ
i
p − Φ
i
l]
+ − xip
∑
l∈Si
[Φil − Φ
i
p]
+
}
=
∑
i∈I
∑
p,l,q∈Si
xip[Φ
i
l − Φ
i
p]
+
{
([Φiq − Φ
i
l]
+)2 − ([Φiq − Φ
i
p]
+)2
}
.
Recall that BΦ(x) ∈ TX(x), thus 〈BΦ(x), JF (x)BΦ(x)〉 ≤ 0 since Γ(Φ) is dissipative. Also notice
that if Φil−Φ
i
p > 0, then Φ
i
q−Φ
i
p > Φ
i
q−Φ
i
l and thus [Φ
i
q−Φ
i
p]
+ ≥ [Φiq−Φ
i
l]
+. As a consequence,
each term in A is non positive. By taking only the terms such that q = l, one obtains:
〈∇H(x),BΦ(x)〉 ≤ −
∑
i∈I
∑
p,l,q∈Si
xip([Φ
i
l(x)− Φ
i
p(x)]
+)3 ≤ 0.
In addition, 〈∇H(x),BΦ(x)〉 = 0 if and only if for all i ∈ I and all p ∈ S
i, either xip = 0 or
Φip(x) ≥ Φ
i
l(x) for all l ∈ S
i; equivalently BΦ(x) = 0.
Therefore, H is a strict Lyapunov function.
Clearly, H(x) ≥ 0. And the equality holds if and only if for all i ∈ I and all q ∈ Si, either
xiq = 0 or Φ
i
q(x) ≥ Φ
i
p(x) for all p ∈ S
i; equivalently, x ∈ NE(Φ).
This result is proved by Smith [28] in one-population setting.
(4) LP: Given an equilibrium x∗, let H(x) = 12‖x− x
∗‖2.
Recall that for all x ∈ X, x∗ − x ∈ TX(x), thus 〈x
∗ − x,ΠNX (x)[Φ(x)]〉 ≤ 0. Then:
〈∇H(x),BΦ(x)〉 =
∑
i∈I
〈xi − xi∗,ΠT
Xi
(xi)[Φ
i(x)]〉 = 〈x− x∗,ΠTX(x)[Φ(x)]〉
= 〈x− x∗,Φ(x)−ΠNX(x)[Φ(x)]〉 = 〈x− x
∗,Φ(x)〉 − 〈x− x∗,ΠNX(x)[Φ(x)]〉
≤ 〈x− x∗,Φ(x)− Φ(x∗)〉+ 〈x− x∗,Φ(x∗)〉 ≤ 0,
because Γ(Φ) is dissipative and x∗ is an equilibrium. Besides, when Γ(Φ) is strictly dissipative,
the equality holds if and only if x = x∗, the unique equilibrium.
Therefore, H is a global Lyapunov function when F is dissipative. In addition, H is a global
strict Lyapunov function when Γ(Φ) is strictly dissipative.
This result is proved by Nagurney and Zhang [18] in one-population setting.
(5) GP: H(x) = supy∈X L(x, y) with L(x, y) = 〈y − x,Φ(x)〉 −
1
2‖y − x‖
2, for x, y ∈ X.
Since:
‖y − (x+Φ(x))‖2 = ‖y − x‖2 + ‖Φ(x)‖2 − 2〈y − x,Φ(x)〉,
one has H(x) = L(x, y∗(x)) with y∗(x) = ΠX(x+Φ(x)). By the Envelope theorem:
∇H(x) = ∇xL(x, y
∗(x)) = −Φ(x) + (y∗(x)− x)(JτΦ(x) + I)
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so that:
〈∇H(x),BΦ(x)〉 = 〈−Φ(x) + (y
∗(x)− x)(JτΦ(x) + I), y
∗(x)− x〉
= 〈(x+Φ(x))−ΠX(x+Φ(x)), x−ΠX(x+Φ(x))〉+ 〈BΦ(x), JΦ(x)BΦ(x)〉 ≤ 0.
The first term is negative by property of ΠX . The second term is negative because Γ(Φ) is
dissipative.
Therefore, H is a global Lyapunov function.
Note that H is a global strict Lyapunov function when Γ(Φ) is strictly dissipative.
Finally,
H(x) = 〈ΠX(x+Φ(x))− x,Φ(x)〉 −
1
2‖ΠX(x+Φ(x))− x‖
2
= 12‖Φ(x)‖
2 − 12‖ΠX(x+Φ(x))− (x+Φ(x))‖
2
= 12‖(x+Φ(x))− x‖
2 − 12‖(x+Φ(x))−ΠX(x+Φ(x))‖
2 ≥ 0.
The inequality is due to the definition of projection ΠX , and the equality holds if and only if
x = ΠX(x+Φ(x)), i.e. x ∈ NE(Φ).
This result is proved by Pappalardo and Passacantando [20] in one-population setting.
(6) BR: H(x) = supy∈X M(x, y) with M(x, y) = 〈y − x,Φ(x)〉, for x, y ∈ X.
Let H(x) =M(x, y¯(x)) with y¯(x) ∈ BR(x). By the Envelope theorem, for any y¯(x),
∇H(x) = ∇xM(x, y¯(x)) = −Φ(x) + (y¯(x)− x)J
τ
Φ(x)
Hence,
〈∇H,BΦ(x)〉 = 〈−Φ(x) + (y¯(x)− x)J
τ
Φ(x), y¯(x)− x〉 = −H(x) + 〈BΦ(x), JΦ(x)BΦ(x)〉 ≤ 0.
The second term is negative because Γ(Φ) is dissipative. Then the equality holds if and only if
H(x) = 0 or, equivalently, x ∈ NE(Φ).
Therefore H is a strict Lyapunov function.
This result is proven by Hofbauer and Sandholm [12] for population games. 
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